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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Cumulative Prospect Theory
is a serious alternative for Expected Utility Theory. It does not contradict Ex-
pected Utility, but includes it as a special example. A very useful example,
because simple and yet very flexible, Expected Utility proved indispensable in
many areas of economic analysis. Though a special example, because it does
not capture some important effects observed in real choice behavior.
This paper is organized as follows.1 In section 2, we try to outline the most im-
portant elements not embodied in Expected Utility Model, but systematically
found in observed pattern of choices among decision makers. In section 3, we
describe briefly the body of Prospect Theory, a very influential, early alternative
to Expected Utility. Influential, because it is the first important contribution
which tries to build a bridge between psychology and traditional economics. It
initiated the whole wave of papers investigating psychological motives under-
lying decision processes. In section 4, we start by stating the problem with
Prospect Theory as a way to rigorously model decision making - the difficul-
ties in formalizing the editing phase of Prospect Theory and more importantly,
the possibility of non-monotonicity. The Rank Dependent model is shown to
solve the non-monotonicity problem of Prospect Theory. Furthermore, it is
1In this paper, we decided not to adopt theorem-proof writing style since we want to focus
on intuition of results rather than mathematical rigor. Besides, most of the results presented
in this article were already proved before.
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argued that Rank Dependence model and the underlying assumptions are not
just merely a technical tool, but there is a simple intuition behind. In section 5,
we finally arrive at Cumulative Prospect Theory - the idea, which now in view
of the models introduced in the preceding sections, makes perfect sense. The
Cumulative Prospect Theory is shown to combine core elements of Prospect
Theory, Rank-Dependent models, and additionally sign-dependence, which is a
novel feature of the new model. Section 6 describes risk attitudes in Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory. The aim here is to show, that the new theory is perfectly
capable of incorporating any desired risk attitude, and more importantly, that
these risk attitudes can be represented in a simple way. We describe stochastic
dominance in Cumulative Prospect Theory, probability weighting issues and
loss aversion. In section 7 we give some examples of economic phenomena ex-
plained by the new theory, try to point out some important environments in
which we can expect the new model to produce better results than Expected
Utility Theory and conclude.
2 Expected Utility Model - Critique
2 The choice under uncertainty or risk is a fundamental issue in economics.
Risk and uncertainty refer to situations where the decision-maker is faced with
randomness. In case of risk there is some objective distribution over this ran-
domness, whereas in case of uncertainty there is no. Without going into philo-
sophical disputes, asking what exactly is this objective distribution, we simply
assume that this is something given. It means we are given some reliable prob-
abilities of events.3
In case of choice under risk, it was von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) who
demonstrated how a set of apparently reasonable axioms on preference can be
shown to imply Expected Utility model (EU).
Savage (1954) demonstrated the same for the case of uncertainty providing
grounds for Subjective Expected Utility model (SEU). The two models are ba-
sically equivalent, with one difference - in case of risk we are given the objective
distribution and in case of uncertainty we build instead a distribution over sub-
jective beliefs, which obey the properties of probability measure.
2This section draws on the following articles: Starmer (2000), Machina (2005), Nau (2004).
3We can think of rolling a dice, throwing a coin or playing a roulette game as situations
in which we are given some objective distribution over the outcomes. On the other hand, the
outcome of a football game or some military conflict might rather be regarded as uncertain,
in which case we are not given any objective probability distribution over the outcome space.
2
CPT Michal Lewandowski
Let us concentrate for the time being on the former case and more specifically
we assume that that the object of choice is finite outcome lotteries of the form:
p ≡ (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) (1)
assigning outcome xi with probability pi.
Ordering (transitivity and completeness) and continuity axioms together imply
that the preferences over lotteries can be represented by a function V (.), which
assigns a real-valued index to each lottery. The crucial axiom of EU model
is independence. It requires that for all lotteries p,q, r : if p < q then
(p, p; r, 1 − p) < (q, p; r, 1 − p). If independence holds together with ordering
and continuity, then preferences over lotteries, such as in (1) can be represented
by:
VEU (p) =
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) (2)
where u(.) is the so called von Neumann Morgenstern utility function defined
on the set of outcomes. The main strength of EU representation is its simplic-
ity. Before Expected Utility was introduced, people tended to accept expected
value representation. However, it leads to Saint Petersburg paradox and does
not allow for variable risk attitudes. In EU both these problems are circum-
vented and more importantly, its mathematical properties allow very simple,
straightforward, and yet very flexible representation of risk. Let me give you
few examples:
• VEU (.) exhibits first order stochastic dominance preference iff U(x) is an
increasing function of x
• VEU (.) exhibits risk aversion iff U(x) is a concave function of x
• V ∗EU (.) is at least as risk averse as VEU (.) iff its utility function u∗(.) is a
concave transformation of u(.)
It is well known that the Expected Utility paradigm is very well established
and there are many extremely important contributions based on this paradigm.
To question this paradigm is therefore not an easy task. Economists have tried
it already for fifty years, but Expected Utility still prevails. The main reason,
that this theory is so popular is its parsimony. Very simple assumptions allow
huge flexibility and produce results consistent with observed behavior in a wide
variety of economic environments. All known alternatives for Expected Utility
does not achieve this level of parsimony, thus to make a strong case for at least
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one of them, we have to show that there are many environments in which an
alternative theory works fine and Expected Utility doesn’t work.
The Expected Utility, meaning both Expected Utility Theory and Subjective
Utility Theory, critique which follows can be divided into three broad classes:
• Violations of independence axiom
• Violations of descriptive and procedural invariance
• Source dependence
2.1 Violations of independence axiom
Violations of the independence axiom, as documented by a huge experimental
and empirical literature usually fall within two broad groups:
• Common consequence effect
• Common ratio effect
Common consequence effect
Suppose we have four compound lotteries:
b1 ≡ (x, p;P∗∗, 1− p) b2 ≡ (P, p;P∗∗, 1− p)
b3 ≡ (x, p;P∗, 1− p) b4 ≡ (P, p;P∗, 1− p)
where P involves positive outcomes both greater and less than x, and P∗∗ first
order stochastically dominates (FOSD) P∗.
There is strong evidence in the literature that people often follow the pattern of
choice, which reveals the following preferences: b1  b2, b4  b3. However
the independence axiom requires the following:
x < P⇒ b1 < b2, b3 < b4
x 4 P⇒ b1 4 b2, b3 4 b4
which is obviously in contradiction with the revealed preferences stated above.4
Common ratio effect
Suppose we have four lotteries:
c1 ≡ (x, p; 0, 1− p) c2 ≡ (y, q; 0, 1− q)
c3 ≡ (x, αp; 0, 1− αp) c4 ≡ (y, αq; 0, 1− αq)
4The famous Allais paradox is a special case of common consequence effect.
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where p > q and 0 < x < y.
There is strong evidence in the literature that people often follow the pattern of
choice which reveals the following preferences: c1  c2, c4  c3. Observe that
c3 and c4 can both be written as compound lotteries in the following manner:
c3 = (c1, α; 0, 1− α), c4 = (c2, α; 0, 1− α).
Given that, the independence axiom requires:
c1 < c2 ⇒ c3 < c4
c1 < c2 ⇒ c3 < c4
which is again in contradiction with the revealed preferences stated above.
But for one difference, both common consequence and common ratio effect can
be shown in the same manner as above for lotteries with negative outcomes.
The difference is that revealed preference for lotteries with negative outcomes
is everywhere reversed in comparison to lotteries with positive outcomes (4
instead of <). This phenomenon, that changing the sign of outcomes changes
the revealed preference everywhere, is called the reflection principle.
2.2 Violations of descriptive and procedural invariance
Whereas economists usually agree that the theory of choice should account for
violations of independence, they are not so unanimous about violations of de-
scriptive and procedural invariance and violations of transitivity, monotonicity
(first order stochastically dominating lotteries should be preferred to lotteries
which they dominate) and completeness. Behavioral economists usually focus
on descriptive theory and as such, they are willing to include any serious vi-
olation of classical theory assumptions as long as it allows them to describe
real people behavior. ”Orthodox” economists are more interested in normative
aspects of the theory and accept certain axioms as long as they sound reason-
able. Reasonable in a sense, that by violating it consciously, a decision maker
would contradict the principle of maximizing the given objective, which he/she
is assumed to maximize.
Violations of completeness, transitivity and monotonicity, although very likely
to occur in the real world, didn’t get much attention in economics literature,
since it is believed that economics is amenable to mathematical description and
without ordering axioms we cannot even define the meaningful concept of pref-
erence. Economists usually also agree, that violations of monotonicity could at
most be a mistake in individual evaluation and not something which systemat-
ically happens in choice decisions.
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That leaves us with descriptive and procedural invariance. It gained more at-
tention in economics literature because of the seminal paper by Kahnemann
and Tversky (1979). We can distinguish here several points:
• framing effects - offering a gain or a loss contingent on the joint oc-
currence of n independent events with probability p often gives different
responses than offering the same loss or gain contingent on the occurrence
of a single event with probability pn
• description form - different responses depending on the description form
of a lottery: matrix form, decision tree, roulette wheels, written state-
ments, etc.
• gamble or insure - different responses for identical problems but framed
either whether to gamble or whether to insure
• response mode effects - different responses depending on whether an
experiment was designed to elicit certainty equivalent, gain equivalent
or probability equivalent (which under EUT all should yield equivalently
assessed utility functions)
• preference reversal - given two lotteries: the so called $-bet (X, p; 0, 1−
p), and the so called P-bet (x, P ; 0, 1−P ) where X > x and P > p, people
usually choose the P-bet but assign higher certainty equivalent to the $-
bet
• reference dependence - this is one of the two building blocks of Kah-
nemann and Tversky (1979) seminal contribution - it states that people
usually do not assess final asset positions but they assess each outcome
relative to some reference point and therefore they code outcomes as gains
and losses
2.3 Source dependence
Source dependence concerns the distinction between risk and different kinds
of uncertainty. Some economists argued that the expectation principle can
be applied to decision under risk, where probabilities are known but not to
decision under uncertainty or ignorance where probabilities are not known.
There is strong evidence in the literature that agents’ preferences depend not
only on the degree of uncertainty but also on the source of uncertainty. This
phenomenon, together with the problem of nonexistence of probabilistic beliefs,
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can be illustrated by Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Suppose we have an
urn with 30 red (R) balls and 60 other balls, either black (B) or yellow (Y).
So there is 90 balls in the urn and the experiment is to choose one of them.
Now consider four acts, where an act is the equivalent of a lottery in case of
uncertainty - instead of probabilities of outcomes, we are given events, each of
them yielding a particular outcome:
f1 ≡ (100,R; 0,B; 0,Y),
f2 ≡ ( 0,R; 100,B; 0,Y)
f3 ≡ (100,R; 0,B; 100,Y)
f4 ≡ ( 0,R; 100,B; 100,Y)
It is commonly observed that people usually choose f1 against f2 and f4 against
f3. However such preferences are inconsistent with any assignment of subjec-
tive probabilities µ(R), µ(B), µ(Y). To see this notice that if an individual
were choosing according to SEU, then we could infer from the first choice that:
µ(R) > µ(B) and from the second choice that: µ(R∪Y) < µ(B∪Y) and because
probabilities sum to one: 1−µ(B) < 1−µ(R). Hence µ(B) > µ(R), which con-
tradicts the first choice. A preference for acts based on probabilistic partitions
over acts based on subjective partitions is called ambiguity aversion. This is
an important example of source dependence. People prefer to choose from the
known distribution, rather than from the unknown one, although there is no
objective reason why they should expect the unknown distribution to be less
favorable.
3 Prospect Theory
5 This section will briefly sketch the outline of Prospect Theory (PT) (Kah-
nemann and Tversky, 1979), as one of the two building blocks of Cumulative
Prospect Theory.6
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) started with stating the three basic tenets of
Expected Utility Theory (EUT):
• the expectation principle: V (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) =
∑n
i=1 piu(xi)
• asset integration: (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) is acceptable at asset position w iff
V (w + x1, p1; ...;w + xn, pn) > u(w)
5This section is based on Kahnemann and Tversky (1979).
6Prospect Theory is only for decisions under risk. Cumulative Prospect Theory was ex-
tended to the case of uncertainty as well.
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• risk aversion: u(.) is a concave function of its argument
Then they presented evidence against these three basic tenets. Although this
evidence is just a part of critique presented in the previous section, it is worth
underscoring the main body of this evidence, because it gives direct motivation
for the Prospect Theory. There are two basic effects emphasized in the paper:
• Certainty effect - can be shown both as a special case of common con-
sequence and common ratio effect. It shows that people tend to violate
the expectation principle if they are to choose between the lottery with
certain outcome and the lottery with uncertain outcomes.
• The other effect occurs with lotteries in which it is highly unlikely but
possible to win. In such circumstances, people tend to choose larger gain
/ smaller probability lottery, which often contradicts Expected Utility.
Both these effects indicate that people distort probability scale. The reason
may be that the intuition of extreme probabilities like 0.001 or 0.999 is hard
to grasp psychologically. Throwing a coin can give you quick intuition for 0.5
probability, but not for 0.001. The other reason may be that people inten-
tionally pay more attention to extreme events and they choose as though they
are implicitly assigning different-than-objective probabilities in their decision
making. Or finally, it may be that since we usually make thousands of small
decisions every day, we tend to use simple heuristics which simplify any given
choice problem at hand. We may round some probabilities and neglect the oth-
ers depending on our quick perception, and we may pay more attention to the
possibility of big changes in our status quo, which in turn happen usually with
small probability. Whatever the reason, the fact is that we tend to overweight
small probabilities of extreme events and underweight probabilities
of moderate events.
There are two other crucial points of Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) critique
of EUT.
The first concerns the so called probabilistic insurance7. According to such
an insurance scheme, you pay half of the regular premium. In case of damage,
there is 50 per cent chance that you pay the other half of the premium and
your losses are covered, and there is 50 per cent chance that you get back your
insurance payment and suffer all the losses. The evidence suggests that people
prefer regular insurance over probabilistic one. However, EUT predicts the op-
posite.
7It should not be confused with partial insurance.
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The other systematic violation of the EU paradigm pointed out by Kahnemann
and Tversky (1979) is the isolation effect. This effect occurs when the deci-
sion problem is sequential. In this case, people tend to ignore previous stages
when making a decision at subsequent stages. This violates the EU basic sup-
position, that people evaluate final asset positions and the only probabilities
that matter are the probabilities of final states. Isolation effect suggests that
people evaluate outcomes of a lottery relative to some reference point, which
usually correspond to the status quo. If the problem is sequential, the status
quo of a decision maker changes after each stage and the subsequent stages are
evaluated relative to a different reference point.
After the critique of Expected Utility Theory, Kahnemann and Tversky (1979)
presented their model. According to it, the choice process involves two phases:
editing and evaluation of prospects.
• Editing is meant to serve as a preliminary analysis of a prospect.8 It
specifies rules how to simplify a problem, it involves defining a reference
point and hence deciding what is to be regarded as losses and what as
gains, and possibly detecting dominance. This phase is needed to avoid
some basic inconsistencies in choice.9
• Evaluation follows certain rules derived from observed agents’ behavior.
The most important two contributions are:
– reference dependence - the carriers of value are gains and losses,
which are perceived and hence evaluated differently, and not final
assets
– decision weights - nonlinear distortion of probability scale
There are two main conditions imposed on the shape of utility function and
probability distortion in prospect theory, which follow from observed behavior:
• The first is loss aversion, according to which losses loom larger than
gains. It means that utility function for losses is steeper than for gains,
8Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory use the notion of prospect and value
function instead of lottery/act and utility function, respectively, to underscore the reference
dependence aspect of this theory. Prospects involve gains and losses instead of final assets.
9In Cumulative Prospect Theory, the authors abandoned the idea of editing phase. The
reason for this is that it is difficult to formalize it, especially because the order of actions
taken in this phase can have effects on what form of prospect survives until evaluation phase.
However, as Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) emphasize, this phase plays important role in
the decision making process and it can account for some oddities in observed choices.
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and in particular there is a kink at the reference point. We will see in one
of the subsequent sections that this kink plays important role in measuring
loss aversion.
• The second is diminishing sensitivity, which implies that the impact
of change in a given variable diminishes with a distance from the refer-
ence point. In terms of utility function, it means that it is concave for
gains and convex for losses with u(0) = 0. In terms of probability distor-
tion, there are two natural reference points -boundaries. One is certainty
(probability one) and the other is impossibility (probability zero). The
principle of diminishing sensitivity in this case means that the probabil-
ity distortion (which is a continuous, strictly increasing function w(.) on
[0, 1] domain with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1) has an inverse S-shape. The
impact of a given change in probability diminishes with its distance from
the boundary.
The implicit assumption of prospect theory is that the decision weight assigned
to a specific outcome depends only on the probability of this outcome.10 We will
see in the next section that this assumption generates certain problems. It does
not always satisfy stochastic dominance, which is regarded as highly undesirable
by most economists.11 And also, it is not readily extended to lotteries with a
large number of outcomes. However the Rank Dependent model presented in the
next section circumvents this problem. Kahnemann and Tversky (1992) in turn
combine Prospect Theory and Rank Dependent model into one - Cumulative
Prospect Theory, which will be introduced later in this paper.
4 Rank Dependence-Intuition
12 The main problem with Prospect Theory is that it does not always satisfy
stochastic dominance13 and it is widely believed that any satisfactory theory
should satisfy it. In this section we demonstrate that the central assumptions
underlying the Rank Dependent models solve the problem posed by prospect
theory and at the same time follow from intuitive arguments. We shall focus
here on the case of uncertainty and not risk, since the analysis is parallel for
10Alternatively for the case of uncertainty only on the event generating this outcome.
11Machina (1983, p.97) argues that any theory, which fails to guarantee monotonicity is ”in
the author’s view at last, unacceptable as a descriptive or analytical model of behavior.”
12This section draws on Diecidue and Wakker (2001).
13See assumption A2 below.
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both cases and uncertainty offers more generality.
Let S be an exhaustive mutually exclusive set of states of nature. Acts are
finite-valued functions f : S → R where R is an outcome space. We de-
note f ≡ (x1, E1; ...;xn, En) where an event Ei yields outcome xi. Events
Ei; i = 1, ..., n form a partition of the state space. We impose the following
assumptions:
A1: (General Weighting Model) An act (x1, E1; ...;xn, En) is evaluated
according to:
∑n
i=1 piiu(xi) where pii’s are nonnegative decision weights which
sum to one for all partitions of state space and u(.) is a utility function.
A2: (Monotonicity) First order stochastically dominating acts are preferred
to acts which they dominate.
In the original version of Prospect Theory (KT1979), the following assump-
tion was implicitly made:
A3’: (Independence of beliefs from tastes) The decision weight pii de-
pends only on Ei.
To see why we require that decision weights sum to one (see assumption A1) con-
sider the partition E1, E2 of the state space and suppose first that pi1+ pi2 > 1.
Then it is possible to find an  such that an act (x1, E1;x1−, E2) is preferred to
(x1, S), given continuity of U(.). This preference however violates monotonic-
ity. Now suppose pi1 + pi2 < 1. Then again it is possible to find an  such that
an act (x1, S) is preferred to (x1, E1;x1 + , E2), although it is stochastically
dominated by the latter act. The argument extends straightforwardly to more
complex acts. Thus, decision weights should sum to one if we want to sustain
monotonicity.
Result 1: Assumptions A1 and A3’ imply additivity i.e. for all disjoint events
A,B: piA∪B = piA + piB.
Proof
By A3’ we can define for each event E a decision weight W (E). The deci-
sion weights of all events in a given partition of S sum to one by A1. Hence
W (E1 ∪ E2) = W (S) −W (S \ (E1 ∪ E2)) = W (E1) +W (E2). Then W is a
probability measure and Subjective Expected Utility follows. 2
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The result above means that we can not implement nonadditive measures, which
was a crucial part of Prospect Theory, if we make assumption A3’, given the
general framework of assumption A1. Therefore we are interested in relaxing
assumption A3’. There is some preliminary work before we can do it. First,
each act has to be transformed into the rank-ordered act. It suffices to combine
equal outcomes together and to reorder them so that an act can be presented
as: (x1, E1; ...;xn, En); x1 < x2 < ... < xn. Define Di ≡ E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ei, which
describes an event of getting an outcome which is worse or equivalent to Ei.
Thus Di determines the ranking position of an event Ei.
A3: (Rank dependence) The decision weight pii depends on Ei and Di.
Given the above assumption, the decision weight of the maximal outcome xn
depends only on En, its ranking position being always Dn = S. Let’s define
a function W (.) which will be the decision weight of the highest outcome xn.
It is called a capacity and it satisfies the properties of probability measure
except for additivity: i.e. W (∅) = 0 and W (S) = 1. Additionally it satisfies
the following requirement: if A ⊂ B then W (A) ≤W (B).14
This last requirement has an intuitive explanation. To see this, consider two
acts: (x,A; y,B ∪ C) and (x,A ∪ B; y, C) where x > y. By monotonicity of u:
piA∪Bu(x) + piCu(y) ≥ piAu(x) + piB∪Cu(y). Since x is the highest outcome in
both acts, we know that: piA∪B = W (A ∪ B) and piA = W (A). Because the
decision weights on both sides of the above inequality sum to one, we also have:
piB∪C = 1−W (A) and piC = 1−W (A∪B). Substituting this into the inequal-
ity above and rearranging, we obtain: (u(x) − u(y))(W (A ∪ B) −W (A)) ≥ 0.
Since u(x) > u(y), it must be that W (A ∪ B) ≥ W (A) and because we
chose A and B arbitrarily, it follows that: A ⊂ (A ∪ B) = F and for any
A ⊂ F : W (A) ≤W (F ).
The above argument shows us the intuitive meaning of the concept of capacity.
There is additionally one condition, which we would like to impose on capac-
ity. It is called solvability and it is merely a technical condition, which can be
regarded as an equivalent of continuity in case of real valued domains. It states
that: ∀{A ⊂ C} ∧ {W (A) ≤ p ≤W (C)} ∃B s.t. {W (B) = p} ∧ {A ⊂ B ⊂
C}.
Now, that we defined the decision weight for the highest outcome, we want to
14If A is a proper subset of B then the inequality is strict.
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do it for the other outcomes as well. Consider the following two rank ordered
acts:
(x1, E1; ...;xi, Ei;xi+1, Ei+1; ...;xn, En)
(x1, E1; ...;xi, Ei; z, (Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En))
where z > xi. It is clear from above, that the ranking positions of the first i
outcomes are the same for both acts. Also the corresponding outcomes in both
acts are contingent on the occurrence of the same events. Hence by A3, those
elements have the same decision weights in both acts. Moreover the outcome z
in the second act happens to be the highest outcome in this act and hence its
decision weight is W (Ei+1 ∪ ...∪En). If we denote the decision weights: piIi for
the first act and piIIi for the second act, we can write:
piIi+1 + ...+ pi
I
n = 1− (piI1 + ...+ piIi )
= 1− (piII1 + ...+ piIIi )
= W (Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En)
And it follows directly that:
pii =
n∑
j=i
pij −
n∑
j=i+1
pij =W (Ei ∪ ... ∪ En)−W (Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En) (3)
Let’s summarize the above argument.
Result 2: Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 imply the so called Choquet ex-
pected utility: the rank ordered act (x1, E1; ...;xn, En) is evaluated according
to:
∑n
i=1 piiu(xi), where pii’s are defined by (3) above.
The concept of capacity is quite vague without imposing any further require-
ments on it. Suppose we want to investigate what restrictions should be im-
posed on a capacity if a given agent is pessimistic, in the sense that, ceteris
paribus, he puts more weight on the events with worse ranking position. As-
sume that there is an event E yielding outcome x with the ranking position
D. Thus, its decision weight is: W (E ∪ Dc) − W (Dc). Worsening ranking
position means decreasing D. Hence, pessimism implies that if C ⊂ D, then
W (E ∪Cc)−W (Cc) ≥W (E ∪Dc)−W (Dc). Define A = Cc and B = E ∪Dc.
Then notice that:
A ∪B = Cc ∪ (E ∪Dc) = (Cc ∪ E) ∪ (Cc ∪Dc) = (Cc ∪ E) ∪ Cc = E ∪ Cc
A ∩B = Cc ∩ (E ∪Dc) = (Cc ∩ E) ∪ (Cc ∩Dc) = ∅ ∪Dc = Dc
13
CPT Michal Lewandowski
So pessimism implies convex capacity, where convex capacity is defined as:
W (A ∪B) +W (A ∩B) ≥ W (A) +W (B). Similarly optimism implies concave
capacity, which occurs when the above inequality is reversed.
The last point in this section concerns a main identifying assumption of rank
dependence models, i.e. comonotonic independence introduced by Schmei-
dler (1989). It states that the independence axiom15 should be obeyed only
within comonotonic sets of acts. Comonotonic set of acts consists of acts which
have the same ordering of outcomes in terms of events, i.e. there are no states
si and sj , such that: fi > fj ∧ gi < gj , for f, g being acts with outcomes fi, gi,
respectively when state si occurs.
Intuitively, since comonotonic acts have rank correlation 1, they cannot be
used to hedge away each other’s risk through the formation of compound acts.
Within comonotonic sets, the decision maker obeys all the Savage axioms locally
and hence behaves as Expected Utility maximizer. It suggests that we should
use rank dependence models in portfolio management since usually optimal
portfolio aims at hedging against risk, which requires operating on different
comonotonic sets. In case of the real-valued state space, rank-ordered comono-
tonic acts correspond to functions which are monotonically nondecreasing in
the state space.
Let us stress one more thing. The probability weighting in Prospect Theory16
implies transforming each probability individually into some associated decision
weight. The probability weighting in Rank Dependence Models implies trans-
forming the whole cumulative distribution. Hence, the same value of probability
gets different decision weight depending on the ranking position. It is par-
ticulary important not to confuse probability distortion function for Prospect
Theory with probability distortion function for Rank Dependent models. The
difference is especially pronounced for non-simple prospects.17
5 Cumulative Prospect Theory
18We shall present here the Cumulative Prospect Theory under uncertainty, but
we could do similar analysis for the case of risk. As said above, CPT combines
the Rank Dependent model with Prospect Theory. In this section we shall use
15Recall that the independence axiom means, that preferences between lotteries or acts will
be unaffected by substitution of common factors.
16We are talking here about choice under risk.
17Prospect Theory was originally discussed only with simple prospects with at most two
non-zero outcomes.
18This section draws on Kahnemann and Tversky (1992).
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the term prospect to refer to an act which is defined relative to a reference point.
That means, there exists a reference point which is normalized to zero, and all
negative outcomes denote losses, and all positive outcomes denote gains. We
adopt the same notation as in the previous section. We shall deal with rank-
ordered prospects of the following form:
f ≡ (x1, E1; ...;xk, Ek;xk+1, Ek+1; ...;xn, En) (4)
where x1 < ... < xk < 0 < xk+1 < ... < xn. Let’s define a positive and a
negative part of f :
f+ ≡ (0, E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ek;xk+1, Ek+1; ...;xn, En)
f− ≡ (x1, E1; ...;xk, Ek; 0, Ek+1 ∪ ... ∪ En)
The property of CPT called sign dependence19 means that we apply different
weighting schemes for the negative and for the positive part of a prospect. Neg-
ative part is weighted according to pi−i =W
−(E1∪...∪Ei)−W−(E1∪...∪Ei−1),
for i = 1, ..., k and positive part is weighted according to pi+i = W
+(Ei ∪ ... ∪
En) − W+(Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En) for i = k + 1, ..., n, where W− and W+ are two
different nonadditive capacities.20
Sign dependence is not just a minor extension implied by reference depen-
dence. To appreciate this fact, notice that in purely positive or purely negative
prospects the decision weights necessarily sum to one. We can show this by
using equation (3):
n∑
i=1
pii =
n∑
i=1
[W (Ei ∪ ... ∪ En)−W (Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En)]
= W (E1 ∪ ... ∪ En) =W (S) = 1 (5)
However in the case of mixed prospects, Cumulative Prospect Theory does
not assume that decision weights should sum to one. With the usual shape
of probability weighting function they will rather sum to less than one. This
property is called subcertainty. To show this we use the above definitions for
19In CPT the crucial axiom is sign comonotonic independence, so that independence is
satisfied only on the sign comonotonic sets (the same ordering and the same sign).
20For the concept of capacity, see the previous section.
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decision weights to write:
n∑
i=1
pii =
k∑
i=1
[
W−(E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ei)−W−(E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ei−1)
]
+
n∑
i=k+1
[
W+(Ei ∪ ... ∪ En)−W+(Ei+1 ∪ ... ∪ En)
]
= W−(E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ek) +W+(Ek+1 ∪ ... ∪ En)
Recall from the section on intuition of Rank Dependency, that when decision
weights do not sum to one, it is possible to construct examples of choice violat-
ing monotonicity. However, in case of CPT, even though the decision weights do
not necessarily sum to one for mixed prospects, monotonicity is satisfied. The
intuitive explanation for this fact is that when constructing examples of non-
monotonic behavior we need to compare lotteries with some outcomes changing
signs. Where an outcome changes sign, its impact on the CPT representation
changes not only via change of weighting but it also has a reversed effect on the
CPT representation function.
Having discussed sign dependence, we can now show the CPT representation
formula for a given prospect of the form as in (4):
VCPT (f) =
k∑
i=1
pi−i u(xi) +
n∑
i=k+1
pi+i u(xi) (6)
Below we present three basic blocks of Cumulative Prospect Theory:
• prospect theory - reference dependence, the shape of utility function
and weighting function i.e. diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion
• rank-dependence model - in case of uncertainty it is called Choquet
Expected Utility model (CEU), developed by Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa
(1987), in case of risk it is called rank-dependent model, developed by
Quiggin (1982)
• sign-dependence - a novel feature allowing for different weighting schemes
for gains and losses
There is a vast literature on parametric shape of utility function and weight-
ing function (see for example Prelec (1998), Rieger and Wang (2006) or Kah-
nemann and Tversky (1992)). We decided not to spend time on this issue,
because it is primarily of empirical interest.
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6 Risk attitudes in CPT
The big advantage of Expected Utility Theory is its simplicity. The curvature
of a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function alone determines risk attitudes
of a decision maker. It allows simple characterization and the resulting theory
is easily applicable. In case of CPT, risk attitude is characterized by three
elements:
• nonadditive decision weights
• loss aversion - by how much losses loom larger than gains
• basic utility - measuring the intrinsic value of particular outcome
In this section we will try to sketch some methods of characterizing risk in CPT
setting. We will focus on the first two of the above mentioned elements of risk
attitude, because these two elements are novel feature of CPT as compared to
EUT.
First, we shall introduce and derive stochastic dominance result for Cumulative
Prospect Theory. Before we do it, let us present an extended version of CPT,
which allows for continuous outcome space. It is straightforward to show that
the CPT utility function in this case is:
V (x, F ) =
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)d[w−(F (x))] +
∫ 0
∞
u(x)d[w+(1− F (x))]
=
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)d[w−(F (x))] +
∫ ∞
0
u(x)d[w+(F (x))] (7)
where F (x) =
∫ x
−∞ dp is a cumulative distribution function for outcomes. To
see how this formulation includes the discrete case, we can set p(x) =
∑
i δxipi,
where δx is a Dirac probability mass at x and probabilities satisfy usual require-
ments.
6.1 Stochastic Dominance in Cumulative Prospect Theory
Stochastic dominance for Cumulative Prospect Theory can be stated as: F is
preferred to G iff: ∫ 0
−∞
u(x)d[w−(F (x))] +
∫ ∞
0
u(x)d[w+(F (x))]
≥
∫ 0
−∞
u(x)d[w−(G(x))] +
∫ ∞
0
u(x)d[w+(G(x))] (8)
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Integrating by parts all four integrals in the above inequality results in (a, b are
the lower and upper bound for outcome space, they are allowed to be −∞, +∞
respectively):
[u(x)w−(F (x))]0a + [u(x)w+(F (x))]
b
0
−
∫ 0
a
u′(x)w−(F (x))dx−
∫ b
0
u′(x)w+(F (x))dx
≥ [u(x)w−(G(x))]0a + [u(x)w+(G(x))]b0
−
∫ 0
a
u′(x)w−(G(x))dx−
∫ b
0
u′(x)w+(G(x))dx
The first elements both on the LHS and the RHS are zero because u(0) = 0,
w−(F (a)) = 0 and w−(G(a)) = 0. Both second elements on the RHS and the
LHS are equal to u(b) because u(0) = 0 and w+(F (b)) = 1 and w+(G(b)) = 1.
So they cancel each other. That leaves us with:∫ 0
a
u′(x)[w−(G(x))− w−(F (x))]dx+
∫ b
0
u′(x)[w+(G(x))− w+(F (x))]dx ≥ 0
Integrating by parts once again gives us the following:[
u′(x)
∫ x
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
]0
a
−
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ x
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx
+
[
u′(x)
∫ x
0
[w+(G(u))− w+(F (u))]du
]b
0
−
∫ b
0
u′′(x)
∫ x
0
[w+(G(u))− w+((u))]dudx ≥ 0
And rewriting:
u′(0)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
−
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ x
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx
+ u′(b)
∫ b
0
[w+(G(u))− w+(F (u))]du
−
∫ b
0
u′′(x)
∫ x
0
[w+(G(u))− w+((u))]dudx ≥ 0 (9)
Notice that for 0 < x ≤ b, we have u′′(x) ≤ 0 and hence: if ∫ x0 [w+(G(u)) −
w+(F (u))]du ≥ 0 holds for all x then the last two terms of the above inequality
are nonnegative. On the other hand, for a ≤ x < 0, we have u′′(x) ≥ 0. Now,
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let us concentrate on the first two terms of the above inequality, decompose the
second term and transform as shown below:
u′(0)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
−
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ x
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx
= u′(0)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
−
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx
+
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ 0
x
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx (10)
Notice that in the second term above we can now separate the two integrals:
−
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)dx
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
= −u′(0)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du+ u′(a)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
We can observe that the first element on the RHS of the above equation cancels
with the first element on the RHS of equation (10). Going back to the whole
inequality (9), we can write:
u′(a)
∫ 0
a
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du
+
∫ 0
a
u′′(x)
∫ 0
x
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]dudx
+ u′(b)
∫ b
0
[w+(G(u))− w+(F (u))]du
−
∫ b
0
u′′(x)
∫ x
0
[w+(G(u))− w+((u))]dudx ≥ 0
The above shows now that: if x ≥ 0 then u′′(x) ≤ 0 and we require ∫ 0x [w−(G(u))−
w−(F (u))]du =
∫ x
0 [−(w−(G(u))−w−(F (u)))]du ≤ 0 and if x ≤ 0 then u′′(x) ≥
0 and we require
∫ 0
x [w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du ≥ 0.
The above derivation may seem a bit messy, so let me summarize. We have
just demonstrated that:
∀x
∫ x
0
[w+(G(u))− w+(F (u))]du ≥ 0 and∫ 0
x
[w−(G(u))− w−(F (u))]du ≥ 0 (11)
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if and only if F dominates G by stochastic dominance in CPT as defined in the
beginning of this section.21 It is possible to design examples in which neither
F nor G dominates the other by First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD),
Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD) and still there is a stochastic dom-
inance in the above sense, even in the case in which w−(.) and w+(.) are identity
functions.22
6.2 Probability weighting
23In this subsection we focus attention on the probability weighting for gains,
because the analysis for losses is identical. So we suppress the superscript ”+”.
We want to formalize the fact that the probability distortion function has an
inverse-S shape. We will however concentrate on the case of uncertainty where
there is actually no probability distortion function, because there is no given
probability. But we can always regard a capacity as nonlinear distortion of a
subjective probability. Needless to say, modeling risk attitudes in uncertainty
case is very similar conceptually to modeling risk attitudes under risk, except
for the fact that uncertainty case is more general since it does not assume the
knowledge of objective probabilities.
A capacityW satisfies subadditivity (SA), if there are events E,E′ such that:
W (B) ≥W (A ∪B)−W (A) whenever W (A ∪B) ≤W (S − E) (12)
1−W (S −B) ≥W (A ∪B)−W (A) whenever W (A) ≥W (E′) (13)
The condition (12) is called lower SA and the condition (13) is called upper
SA. The events E,E′ are called lower and upper boundary events. These
are ”small” events, independent of A and B. For future purposes, let’s define
A < B if there exists a gain y such that (y,A) < (y,B). Obviously: A <
B iff W (A) ≥ W (B). We want to show below that these conditions imply the
observed preference conditions. Recall that in Prospect Theory discussed in
one of the previous sections, there were two effects which suggested nonlinear
distortions of probability: certainty effect and turning highly unlikely possibility
21Well, we showed only the implication in one direction, however the implication in the
other direction follows a similar procedure and hence, is omitted here.
22No probability distortion case.
23This subsection partly follows Tversky and Wakker (1995).
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into impossibility. Formally, we observe certainty effect if: 24
(x, S −B) ∼ (y,A)⇒ (x) < (y,A;x,B), where 0 < x < y,A < E′ (14)
The above statement can easily be derived from the observed choice character-
istics in Allais paradox and from continuity and monotonicity. Observe that
we can obtain the acts on the RHS of the above implication by changing: B
causing 0 to B causing x in the acts on the LHS. Note that outcome x in the
left lottery on the LHS was uncertain and in the left lottery on the RHS it
became certain. Rewrite (14) in terms of CPT:
u(x)W (S −B) = u(y)W (A) =⇒
=⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y)W (A) + u(x)(W (A ∪B)−W (A)) (15)
Now assume, that upper SA holds and multiply both sides of (13) by u(x) and
add and subtract u(y)W (A) from the RHS. We obtain:
u(x)(1−W (S −B)) ≥ u(x)(W (A ∪B)−W (A)) + u(y)W (A)− u(y)W (A)
Now we substitute u(x)W (S−B) = u(y)W (A) from (15) into above inequality
and rearrange:
u(x)− u(x)W (S −B)) ≥ u(x)(W (A ∪B)−W (A)) + u(y)W (A)− u(x)W (S −B)
u(x) ≥ u(y)W (A) + u(x)(W (A ∪B)−W (A))
Hence, we showed that upper SA implies certainty effect in CPT. Tversky and
Wakker (1995) show the implication in the other direction as well.
The other effect leading to nonadditive distortions of subjective probability is
turning impossibility into possibility. This leads to overweighting of small
probabilities of extreme events. Formally:
(x) ∼ (y,A;x,B)⇒ (y,B;x, S −B) < (y,A ∪B)
where 0 < x < y, A ∪B 4 S − E (16)
The above statement can again be easily derived from the observed choice
characteristics and from continuity and monotonicity. Note that we can obtain
the acts on the RHS of the above implication by changing: B causing x to B
causing y in the acts on the LHS. This means that outcome y was impossible
24We denote (x) as an act yielding x with certainty (S) and (x,A), where A is a proper
subset of S, as an act yielding x contingent on the occurrence of A and zero otherwise (event
S −A). More complex acts we denote in a similar way.
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in the left lottery on the LHS of the above implication and became possible in
the left lottery on the RHS of the above implication. Rewrite (16) in terms of
CPT:
u(x) = u(y)W (A) + u(x)(W (A ∪B)−W (A)) =⇒
=⇒ u(y)W (A ∪B) ≤ u(y)W (B) + u(x)(1−W (B)) (17)
Now assume lower SA holds and multiply both sides of (12) by u(y) − u(x)
and substitute u(x) = u(y)W (A) + u(x)(W (A ∪ B) − W (A)) from (17), or
−u(x)(W (A ∪ B) −W (A)) = u(y)W (A) − u(x) into the resulting inequality.
We obtain then:
(u(y)− u(x))W (B) ≥ u(y)(W (A ∪B)−W (A)) + u(y)W (A)− u(x)
u(y)W (B) + u(x)(1−W (B)) ≥ u(y)W (A ∪B)
And hence we showed that lower SA implies the effect of overweighting small
probabilities. Again, Tversky and Wakker (1995) proved also the implication
in the other direction. To summarize:
Result on subadditivity: Under the usual requirements, the weighting func-
tion W satisfies SA iff (14) and (16) are satisfied.
It should be emphasized here, that lower and upper subadditivity should be in-
terpreted with caution. The motivation for introducing these conditions was the
observed pattern of choices - paying to much attention to extreme events and too
little attention to intermediate events. Suppose we switch for the moment to the
risk situation and imagine we have a probability distortion function w(.) which
transforms cumulative probabilities. Lower subadditivity for risk can be writ-
ten as: w(p) ≥ w(p+q)−w(q), for w(p+q) ≤ w(1− ), where  is a boundary
probability. We can transform this condition into: w(p)−w(0)p ≥ w(p+q)−w(q)p and
letting p approach zero we obtain: w′(0) ≥ w′(q), for w(q) ≤ w(1− ). So the
function w(.) is concave for probabilities in the interval [0, 1−]. Similarly, upper
SA for risk can be written as: 1−w(1−p) ≥ w(p+q)−w(q), for w(q) ≥ w(′),
where ′ is again a boundary probability. Transforming this condition re-
sults in: w(1)−w(1−p)p ≥ w(p+q)−w(q)p and letting p approach zero we obtain:
w′(1) ≥ w′(q), for w(q) ≥ w(′). Thus the function w(.) is convex for prob-
abilities in the interval [′, 1]. It is harmless to assume that ′ ≤ 1 − . In this
case, we have a concave region for probabilities in [0, ′], possibly linear region
for probabilities [′, 1− ],25 and a convex region for probabilities [1− , 1]. To
25Only if ′ < 1− .
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sum up:
w′′(p)

≤ 0 for p ∈ [0, ′]
= 0 for p ∈ [′, 1− ]
≥ 0 for p ∈ [1− , 1]
(18)
For this kind of function it can happen, that it doesn’t have a fixed point in the
interior of [0, 1] interval. It is possible in two cases: either limp→0w′(p) < 1 or
limp→1w′(p) < 1. In the first case, we observe extreme overweighting of small
probabilities of high ranked events and no overweighting of small probabilities
of low ranked events (w(p) lies entirely below 45-degree line for the interior of
[0, 1]). In the second case, we observe extreme overweighting of small probabil-
ities of low ranked events and no overweighting of small probabilities of high
ranked events (w(p) lies entirely above 45-degree line for the interior of [0, 1]).
There are at least two important implications of the above demonstrations:
First, if we want the probability weighting function to exhibit overweighting
of both small high ranked and and small low ranked events, we have to impose
additional condition on a weighting function, which will ensure the existence of
a fixed point in the interior of [0, 1] interval. We can simply do it by requiring
limp→0w′(p) > 1 and limp→1w′(p) > 1. Together with lower and upper SA, it
guarantees the existence of a fixed point in the interior of [0, 1]. This will fix a
problem in situations under risk. Additionally we can define an index of lower
(upper) SA as: υLSA ≡
[∫ p∗
0 (w(p)− p)dp
]+ (υUSA ≡ [∫ 1p∗(p− w(p))dp]+),
where p∗ is a fixed point of w(p).
Second, the possibility of cases such as described above26 suggests a new way
of looking at pessimism and optimism. In some of the earlier sections, we in-
troduced a concept of pessimism (optimism), which was shown to imply convex
(concave) capacity. In case of risk it is easy to show that pessimism (opti-
mism) implies concave27 (convex) weighting function. The above anomalies of
weighting function suggest however that concave (convex) weighting function
does not imply pessimism (optimism), and hence the implication can be shown
only in one direction. In particular, it is easy to design an example in which
weighting function is concave almost on the whole domain, but there is no
overweighting of lower ranked events and extreme overweighting of high ranked
events.28 This suggests that we should distinguish local pessimism/optimism
26I.e. no overweighting of small high ranked (low ranked) events and extreme overweighting
of small low ranked (high ranked) events.
27Attention: the equivalent of convex capacity in case of risk is concave probability weight-
ing function.
28The same for convex weighting function
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from global pessimism/optimism. Local pessimism (optimism) implies concav-
ity (convexity) of a weighting function. Global pessimism (optimism) would
imply that ∀p : w(p) ≥ p (∀p : w(p) ≤ p). In situations, in which we have
a mix of pessimism (for low values of p) and optimism (for high values of p),
we are assured that a fixed point of w(p) exists in the interior of [0, 1]. Then
we can use the above introduced indexes υLSA and υUSA to measure the de-
gree of optimism within the optimistic part and the degree of pessimism within
the pessimistic part. To understand better the probability weighting in CPT,
especially the difference between probability weighting with small number of
outcomes and probability weighting with continuous outcomes, it might be use-
ful to consider function w′(p) instead of w(p). The weight of a particular event
would then be determined according to: pii =
∫ 1−F (xi−1)
1−F (xi) w
′(p)dp (for losses
pii =
∫ F (xi)
F (xi−1)w
′(p)dp accordingly). In case of continuous outcomes, F (xi−1)
would be arbitrarily close to F (xi) and so the decision weight in this case
would be just pi(x) = w′(F (x)). Moreover in the continuous time, it is easier to
characterize which probabilities are overweighted and which are underweighted.
All p for which w′(p) > 1, are overweighted and all p for which w′(p) < 1 are un-
derweighted. This implies low ranked and high ranked events are overweighted
and moderately ranked events are underweighted.
After this extensive discussion on the issue of subadditivity, we want to
present results concerning comparative subadditivity and as before, we do it
for the case of uncertainty. A transformation τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is called SA if
it satisfies the same requirements as W (.) does in (12) and (13). A weighting
function W2 is more SA than W1, if it is obtained from W1 by SA transforma-
tion. We will prove below the necessity part of the following equivalence:
Result on comparative SA: W2 is more SA than W1 iff W2 is a strictly
increasing transform of W1 and:
W1(C) =W1(A ∪B)−W1(A)⇒W2(C) ≥W2(A ∪B)−W2(A) (19)
∧
1−W1(S − C) =W1(A ∪B)−W1(A) =⇒
=⇒ 1−W2(S − C) ≥W2(A ∪B)−W2(A) (20)
with boundary condition for lower comparative SA (19): W1(A∪B) ≤W1(S−
E) for some E and for upper comparative SA (20): W1(A) ≥W1(E′) for some
E′.
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Proof (⇒): To prove the necessity of this result we just assume W1(C) =
W1(A ∪ B) −W1(A) and write W2(C) = τ(W1(C)) ≥ τ(W1(C) +W1(A)) −
τ(W1(A)) andW2(C) = τ(W1(C)) ≥ τ(W1(A∪B))−τ(W1(A)) =W2(A∪B)−
W2(A), by using our assumption and the lower SA property of τ . The same
for comparative upper SA: assume 1−W1(S − C) = W1(A ∪B)−W1(A) and
write 1 −W2(S − C) = 1 − τ(W1(S − C)) ≥ τ(W1(A ∪ B)) − τ(W1(A)) and
1 −W2(S − C) ≥ W2(A ∪ B) −W2(A), by using the upper SA property of τ
and our assumption. This proves the necessity part of the above result. 2
We could also state the corresponding preference conditions for the proposi-
tion that <2 is more SA than <1. However the statement follows very similar
lines as the statements concerning the analysis of subadditivity (the relation be-
tween SA on the one side, certainty effect and overweighting of extreme events
probabilities on the other side), and hence we omit it here. Another important
thing which we omit here is a so called source sensitivity which measures the
preference over sources of uncertainty. This and other related results can be
found in Tversky and Wakker (1995). The important empirical finding which
we should underscore here is that uncertainty enhances the departures from
expected utility as compared to risk. The nonadditivity in weighting schemes
under uncertainty is more pronounced than nonlinearity in weighting schemes
under risk. Moreover it is found that people prefer risk to uncertainty when
they feel incompetent. In other situations, when they don’t feel incompetent or
ignorant about the subject, people often prefer to bet on an uncertain source.
6.3 Loss aversion
29We assume here that there exists a basic utility function U that reflects the
intrinsic value of outcomes for the individual. Because of the psychological
perception of a reference point, however people evaluate losses differently than
gains. The overall utility u is a composition of a loss aversion index λ > 0, and
the basic utility U . That means we can write:
u(x) =
{
U(x) if x ≥ 0
λU(x) if x < 0
(21)
Now, we can assume that the basic utility U is smooth everywhere but par-
ticularly at the reference point, and the only reason, the kink appears in u at
the reference point is because of λ > 1 (losses loom larger than gains). This is
29This subsection partly follows Koebberling and Wakker (2005).
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obviously quite strict assumption but it reflects the psychological importance of
a reference point and enables disentangling basic utility and loss aversion parts
of risk aversion. Furthermore, the empirical findings suggest that basic utility
embodies the intrinsic value of outcomes, whereas loss aversion and probability
weighting is psychological in nature. Koebberling and Wakker (2005) propose
the following loss aversion index: λ = limx→0 u(−|x|)limx→0 u(|x|) , if the limits limx→0 u(−|x|)
and limx→0 u(|x|) exist. We immediately see that using index λ, requires assum-
ing that loss aversion is a constant fraction of basic utility. The clear advantage
of this approach is that it is independent of the unit of payment. Changes in
scale do not affect the value of this index. The implicit scaling convention in
this definition is that the function U is smooth at zero, so that the left and right
derivative of this function agree at the reference point. We can adopt different
scaling convention, i.e. we can choose y > 0 and set −U(−y) = U(y) which
then results in an index λ1 =
−u(−y)
u(y) . However such scaling conventions are not
independent of the unit of payment anymore. They thus change under different
scaling of outcomes.
The above loss aversion index assumes that it is possible to separate basic util-
ity from loss aversion. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) define loss aversion in
the following way:
for y > x ≥ 0 : u(x) + u(−x) > u(y) + u(−y) (22)
From this definition we can derive two other conditions. First, if we set x = 0
then u(y) < −u(−y). This suggests the above y-scaling condition with the loss
aversion index λ1 =
−u(−y)
u(y) . Second, we can let y approach x. Defining y =
x+∆, we have from (22): for x ≥ 0,∆ > 0 : u(−x)−u(−x−∆)∆ > u(x+∆)−u(x)∆ , and
letting ∆ approach zero, we obtain: u′(−x) > u′(x), so that the utility function
is steeper for losses than for gains. The condition: ∀x > 0 : u′(−x) > u′(x)
is obviously stronger than: ∀x > 0 : −u(−x) > u(x). It suggests that maybe
we should define another index - the index of local loss aversion: λ2 =
−u′(−x)
u′(x) .
This index will inform us, how much more an individual dislikes an additional
marginal loss, given loss of x than he likes an additional marginal gain, given
gain of x. Local loss aversion index, however, would not be separable from basic
utility, which is the main advantage of the Koebberling and Wakker (2005)
formulation (index λ). To sum up, global index of loss aversion λ is useful
because it separates basic utility from loss aversion, but the implied concept of
loss aversion in this setting is weaker than assumed by Kahnemann and Tversky
(1979, p.279).
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7 Cumulative Prospect Theory - Applications and
Concluding Thoughts
30There is a huge literature demonstrating that the Expected Utility paradigm
works pretty well in a wide variety of situations. Why should we then bother to
search for some other theories, such as CPT, which are certainly more complex
and more difficult to apply? Let me give you just a few prominent examples
which answer this question directly:
• Equity premium puzzle - The average observed return to stocks is
higher approximately by 8 per cent than bond returns. Mehra and Prescott
(1985) showed that under the standard assumptions of EUT, investors
must be extremely risk averse to demand such high a premium, which
created a puzzle. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) suggested an answer based
on reference dependence, crucial aspect of CPT. They argued, that in the
short run, for example annually, stock returns are negative much more
frequently than bond returns. Loss averse investors will then naturally
demand large equity premium to compensate for the much higher chance
of losing money.
• Disposition effect - Investors are observed to hold on to stocks that have
lost their value, compared to their purchase price, too long and are eager
to sell stocks that have risen in value too soon. It suggests that investors
are willing to gamble in the domain of losses and are risk averse in the
domain of gains, exactly as predicted by reference dependence. Expected
Utility rules on the other hand, would advise you to keep the stocks as
long as you expect them to grow, and sell them, as long as you expect
them to fall, irrespective of the purchase price.
• Permanent income hypothesis - According to this classic hypothesis,
people should anticipate their lifetime income and spend the constant
fraction of it every period. However, the observed behavior is different.
In particular, it is commonly observed that people spend more, when their
future wages are expected to increase, but they do not cut back when their
future wages are cut. A perfectly suitable explanation would be, that:
first, loss aversion makes people feel awful, when they cut consumption;
second, due to reflection effect, people are willing to gamble, that next
year’s wages may turn out to be better after all.
30This section partly follows Camerer (1998).
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• Racetrack betting, state lotteries, insurance - The nonlinear weight-
ing of probabilities is capable of explaining a lot of observed behavior com-
ing from different situations. In racetrack betting, people tend to com-
monly overbet longshots - horses with relatively small chance of winning.
In case of state lotteries it was observed that large cumulated jackpots
attract huge number of people. In terms of Expected Utility, it can only
be explained by a utility function, which is convex in money. In case of
insurance, people often buy insurance against very small risks. In stan-
dard Expected Utility, a person who is averse to a tiny risk should be
more averse to big risks. Rabin (2000) was the first, who demonstrated
how dramatic the implications of local risk aversion are for global risk
aversion. Hence the aversion for tiny risks would result in enormous aver-
sion for bigger risks, if we were to stick to EUT. All these phenomena,
and these are just few examples, can be explained by nonlinear weighting
of probabilities, in particular by overweighting of small probabilities of
extreme outcomes.
The above examples merely give a touch of flavor of how powerful in explaining
real world phenomena CPT can be. Loss aversion, reflection effects31 and non-
additive weighting are key features of CPT and to appreciate them we need to
enter the world in which EUT sees only paradoxes or puzzles. To summarize, I
will try to sketch the most important situations, in which we can expect to be
better off by applying CPT instead of EUT.
First, we need to have an environment, in which it is reasonable to assume
that people are isolating or bracketing the relevant decisions. Otherwise, the
reference point is difficult to define.
Second, the departure from expected utility due to nonlinear weighting shall be
particularly strong in the presence of some extreme events happening with non-
negligible probability. Non-negligible, because people overweight small proba-
bilities of extreme events, provided that they notice them. If probabilities are
too small people are likely to neglect them. The default probability of one firm is
likely to be non-negligible, but the probability of a major market crash is likely
to be negligible in most situations. So distributions with heavy tails, skewed
distributions are likely to produce larger departures from Expected Utility The-
ory. Distributions can be skewed in a usual sense and also skewed relative to
the reference point - more probability mass put on losses than on gains or the
opposite. Situations like modeling default, insurance or even usual portfolio
31In particular gambling in the domain of losses.
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management commonly involve these kinds of distributions.
Third, departures from classical theory can be expected for situations in which
people perceive some outcomes as losses. Recall, that the utility function for
losses is convex and hence people are likely to gamble in the domain of losses,
contrary to EUT. Also, situations which involve constant shifts of reference are
likely to generate differences between CPT and EUT predictions, because these
shifts change the gain/loss status of outcomes.
Fourth, we should expect larger departures from EUT for situations involving
uncertainty rather than risk.32 The additional issue is also the degree to which
decision makers feel comfortable or familiar with a given choice situation. If
they feel ignorant, they are likely to produce bigger deviation from EUT. The
same argument implies that people like professional market traders should vi-
olate EUT less often.
The above listing consists of some loose thoughts about the range of applications
for CPT. I believe that future research will provide the constantly improving
answer to this question. Many topics in finance, insurance and also in eco-
nomics await being modeled via CPT. There is certainly a lot to be learned
from this modeling. Even proving that some classic results are robust to a
change from EUT to CPT provides deeper understanding on the importance of
different assumptions underlying the theory. It is however certain that many
classic results are not robust to a change from EUT to CPT, and hence they
need reevaluation. It is hoped that this article demonstrated how an intuitive
idea of Cumulative Prospect Theory evolved from experimental and theoretical
literature and more importantly how it can be applied in modeling situations
under risk and uncertainty.
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